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This paper formally analyses the effects that public goods (in a broad
sense) have on tourists and private tourism firms. By approaching the
tourism product as a bundle of characteristics, the paper shows how
the supply of public goods in tourism municipalities positively
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Tourists’ choice of where to spend their holidays is affected not only by the
private supply (the characteristics of hotels, pubs, campsites, or restaurants, for
instance) of the different alternatives under their consideration as possible
holiday destinations. The characteristics of the municipality or region where the
tourism supply lies also play an important role in the final decision: the
cleanliness of the water for swimming, public safety, the approaches to the resort
(roads, airports, railways, ports. . .), or the preservation of the environment
matter. Indeed, if tourists have a positive valuation for public goods, then
higher quantities of inputs with public good characteristics would bring higher
revenues to firms located in jurisdictions with an adequate supply of them. In
a sort of virtuous circle, higher revenues would lead (by means of higher tax
revenues) to higher levels of public goods feeding back successive waves that
would not stop because of diminishing returns (since public goods are non-
rival). Since sustainability of the tourism activity depends on the firms’ ability
to reproduce the inputs entering the production function, a development model
based on public inputs, which are not depleted by their use, is more likely to
be sustainable than one relying on private inputs. In spite of the importance
of the tourism sector to the economies of many countries, there is not a lot
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of research which analyses the effects that the existence (or lack) of public
services and infrastructures has on the private supply of tourism products.
This paper develops a formal analysis of the effects of public goods on private
tourism firms. It is divided into four sections. The first defines tourism goods
as bundles of public and private characteristics or attributes and shows the
effects of public goods on private tourism supply. The section following
discusses some real world implications regarding the sustainability of tourism,
which stem from the model. Next, to check the hypothesis on which the
analysis is built, some empirical evidence is presented on the positive effects
that location has on hotel prices. Finally, concluding remarks point out the
paper’s most relevant findings.
Tourism goods as bundles of characteristics
To analyse the effects of public goods on tourism firms and then obtain
implications for sustainable development, it is enlightening to follow the
framework in Rosen (1974), Bartik (1987) and Epple (1987). In what follows,
it is assumed that a tourism product1 can be understood as a bundle (vector)
of objectively measured public and private characteristics or attributes (say n).
For instance, for a hotel: category (number of stars); services offered (type and
characteristics); distance to leisure facilities; or quantity and quality of public
goods and services. Thus, the product offered by a hotel, j, can be represented
by means of a vector of characteristics
c j = (c j1, c
j
2, . . . , c
j
n–1, z), (1)
where c ji is the measured value of the (private) characteristic, i, and z is an index
bringing together the different public attributes which characterize the
environment where a hotel is located.2 Note that since z is a public good, its
level is the same for all tourism businesses located in the same environment.
Therefore, two hotels, m and n, offer different products whenever cm ≠ cn,3 that
is, whenever any of hotel m’s characteristics differ from those of hotel n. When
the tourism product is sold in a competitive market, then it is reasonable to
assume that a unique price exists for each of the characteristics embedded in
the final product. Thus, it is possible to define a price vector
p(c) = p(c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z), (2)
which consumers and firms take as given. In a competitive market, tourists
choose the product (bundle of public and private characteristics, Equation (1))
which maximizes their utility, taking the price vector (Equation (2)) as given.
On the other hand, firms choose their profit maximizing final output’s mix of
characteristics taking market prices (Equation (2)) and the production technol-
ogy as given. The market reaches the equilibrium when tourists’ and firms’
decisions are compatible. The subsections that follow analyse tourists’ and firms’
decisions in depth, and the resulting market equilibrium.
The decisions of tourists
It is assumed that tourists get utility from the consumption of a stay in a
hotel room in a jurisdiction or municipality and from the consumption of
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other goods, x.4 Thus, the utility function for tourist t can be represented as
ut(x, c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z), (3)
where ∂u/∂x > 0, ∂u/∂ci > 0 and ∂u/∂z > 0.5 Each tourist faces a budget
constraint
x + p (c) = mt (4)
where mt is tourist t’s exogenous income and good x plays the role of numeraire
(so that its price is normalized to 1). The Lagrangian for the problem, given
by Equations (3) and (4), is
L = u(x, c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z) – λ (x + p(c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z) – m). (5)
It is important to note that, when deciding where to spend their holidays,
tourists are able to choose the quantity of public good embedded in the tourism
product purchased. This framework is similar to that proposed by Tiebout
(1956), who assumed that individuals ‘voted with their feet’ when faced with
the decision on which bundle of goods and taxes to choose. Hence, z is a
decision variable for tourists and the first order conditions for utility maximization
are6
∂L   ∂u
–– ≡ –– – λ = 0∂x   ∂x
∂L   ∂u      ∂p
–– ≡ –– – λ –– = 0∂c1 ∂c1         ∂c1
. . . (6)
∂L     ∂u      ∂p
––– ≡ ––– – λ ––– = 0∂cn–1 ∂cn–1        ∂cn–1
∂L   ∂u      ∂p
–– ≡ –– – λ –– = 0.∂z    ∂z ∂z
By reorganizing Equation (6), first order conditions become
      ∂u
      ––
∂p ∂ci
–– = ––– ≡ MRScix ∀i = 1, . . . , n – 1 (7)∂ci ∂u
––
∂x
      ∂u
      ––
∂p ∂z
–– = –– ≡ MRSzx . (8)∂z ∂u
––
∂x
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Assuming that the numeraire good, x, is money, Equation (8)7 shows that a
tourist’s consumption decision regarding the quantity of public good included
in a tourism product is optimal when the amount of money he or she is willing
to pay for the last unit of public good consumed (that is, the tourist’s marginal
willingness to pay, or marginal valuation for the public good) equals the
marginal increase in the tourism product’s price due to the last unit of public
good embedded in that product (∂p/∂z). Note that if the budget constraint were
lineal, then ∂p/∂z = p, so that Equation (8) would not differ from the typical
conditions for the optimal consumption of goods (RMSzx = pz/px). Thus, a
tourist’s willingness to pay for a given bundle of characteristics (taking utility,
–u, and income as given)8
θ (c1, . . . , cn–1, z; –u, m) (9)
may be defined from
u (m – θ, c1, . . . , cn–1, z) = –u. (10)
By differentiating Equation (10) with respect to c1, c2 . . . , cn–1 and z, one
obtains9
,
,
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1
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∂
(11)
where ∂θ/∂ci and ∂θ/∂z are, respectively, the tourist’s marginal willingness to
pay10 for the private and public attributes embedded in the marketed tourism
product.
Hence, θ (c1, . . . , cn–1, z; –u, m) is the maximum amount a tourist is willing
to pay for bundle c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z),
11 and the price effectively paid by a
tourist in the market for that combination is p(c). Therefore, a tourist maximizes
his or her utility when
θ (c1*, c2*, . . . , cn–1*, z*; u*, m) = p (c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z) (12)
and
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1 2 1
*, *,..., *, *; *, *, *,..., *, *
*, *,..., *, *; *, *, *,..., *, *
,
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i ic c c z u m c c c z
c c c z u m c c c z
p
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p
z z
θ
θ
− −
− −
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
(13)
which imply that, at the optimum, a tourist’s willingness to pay for a given
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Figure 1. Tourism product purchase decisions by tourists with different
valuations for public goods.
product (bundle of characteristics) must be equal to the market price (Equation
(12)), and the (marginal) willingness to pay for an additional unit of a given
characteristic must be equal to the marginal increase in the price of the final
product due to that unit of characteristic (Equation (13)). The graphical
representation for two individuals of the analytical results above is shown in
Figure 1, where it is assumed that Tourist 2 has higher valuation (willingness
to pay) for the public good than Tourist 1, so that he or she chooses a product
(given identical private attributes and characteristics) with a greater amount of
public goods. In other words, Tourist 2 chooses to spend his or her holidays
in a municipality with a high supply of public goods and, correspondingly,
expensive hotels,12 whereas Tourist 1 is happy to spend his or her holidays in
a tourism resort where the supply of public goods is lower and hotels are
cheaper.
The decisions of tourism firms
Tourism firms must decide upon the quantity and composition of characteristics
of the products they wish to market (hotel rooms, in the example above). For
firm j, Q(c j) denotes the number of units of the tourism product (for instance,
the number of hotel rooms) with vector of characteristics c j = (c j1, c
j
2, . . . ,
● ●
Quantity of public goods
z1*          z2*
θ, p
θ2* = p2*
θ1* = p1*
θ2(c1*, c2*,…, cn–1*, z; u2*)
Valuation Tourist 2
Valuation Tourist 1
θ1(c1*, c2*,…, cn–1*, z; u1*)
p(c1, c2,…, cn–1, z)
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c jn–1, z). Total costs for each firm, C(Q, c; β) (where β symbolizes factor prices
and the parameters that characterize the production function), are obtained from
factor cost minimization, subject to the production function. It is assumed that
producing an additional hotel room and providing a greater quantity of each
of the hotel rooms’ characteristics, ci, is costly, hence, ∂C/∂Q > 0 and
∂C/∂ci > 0. It is assumed that fixed costs exist and that, individually, a firm
cannot affect the quantity of public good supplied in the municipality in which
it is located. Thus, in the short run, each firm would take z as fixed, that is,
–z. However, in the long run, firms are perfectly mobile, so that they can ‘shop
around’ for the jurisdiction offering the best combination of public goods and
taxes. Thus, z is a decision variable for the firm in the long run. Since providing
a greater quantity of public goods is costly, municipalities with higher
quantities of public goods set higher taxes to cover higher costs of public good
provision, so that it is reasonable to assume that ∂C/∂z > 0.
In this setting, in the long run, firms maximize
π = Qp (c) – C (Q, c1, . . . , cn–1, z). (14)
Note that since firms do not have market power (perfect competition is
assumed), p (c) = p (c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z) does not depend on the number of units
of output, Q. First order conditions13 for profit maximization are
0      1,..., 1
0 ,
i
i i i i
C
p C p c
Q i n
c c c c Q
C
p C p zQ
z z z z Q
π
π
∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
≡ − = ⇒ = ∀ = −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
≡ − = ⇒ =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
(15)
and
( ) ( )0C Cp p
Q Q Q
π∂ ∂ ∂
≡ − = ⇒ =
∂ ∂ ∂
c c , (16)
which imply that each firm is to produce its output by means of a combination
of attributes, such that the additional income obtained from the last unit of
attribute embedded in the tourism output (for example, hotel room) equals the
marginal cost of that attribute per unit of product sold (Equation (15)), and
that revenue obtained from the last unit of product sold (p(c)) equals that unit’s
marginal cost (Equation (16)).14 In the same way as for tourists’ demand,15 it
is useful to define a supply function, φ (c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z; π, β), which gives
the price at which a hotel is willing to sell a room embedding a number of
characteristics or attributes in order to obtain a given level of profit (and
considering that the number of units produced is optimal). The supply function
φ is obtained from
π = Qφ – C (Q, c1, . . . , cn–1, z), (17)
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and
∂C
–– = φ . (18)
∂Q
By differentiating Equation (17) with respect to ci and z, one gets, respectively,
0      1,..., 1
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∂ ∂ ∂
(19)
where ∂φ/∂ci and ∂φ/∂z are, respectively, the prices at which the firm is willing
to market an additional unit of public and private attributes as part of a
composite tourism product.16 The conditions in Equation (19) have the
interpretation that the outcome for a firm is optimal when revenue earned
because of the inclusion of an additional unit of characteristic in the final
product equals the marginal cost of production of that unit of characteristic.
Using Equations (18) and (19), Equations (17) and (16) become
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1 2 1
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π β
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∂ ∂
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
(20)
and
p (c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z) = φ (c1*, c2*, . . . , cn–1*, z*; π*, β), (21)
which may be interpreted in a similar way to, respectively, Equations (12) and
(13); for instance, at the optimum, the price at which a firm is willing to supply
an additional unit of characteristic must be equal to the variation in the price
of the final product due to that additional unit of characteristic (Equation (20)).
Besides, the price at which a firm is willing to supply a given bundle of
characteristics must be equal to the market price of that bundle.
Figure 2 shows, for two firms (A and B), the graphical representation of the
optimal decision with respect to the quantity of public goods embedded in the
final product. Firm A brings to the market a product with lower quantities
of the attribute ‘public good’ than firm B. This would be the case, for instance,
of two firms located in two municipalities, A and B. Jurisdiction A is endowed
with a low quantity of public goods, zA, whereas jurisdiction B supplies a high
amount of public goods, zB.
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Figure 2. Tourism product supply decisions by firms located in different
municipalities.
The equilibrium in the tourism markets
The competitive equilibrium for the economy considered can be defined as the
price vector
p*(c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z) (22)
and allocation
{c*, x*}, (23)
such that Equation (23) solves the problems above and markets clear. For a
given vector of prices (Equation (22)), the quantity that tourists are willing to
buy of a product with a set of characteristics (for instance, the tourists’
consumption plan) must be equal to the quantity (of the same product with
an identical set of characteristics) that tourism firms are willing to sell (for
instance, the firms’ production plans). Thus, the equilibrium which brings
together the wishes of tourists and firms arises when the valuation functions
for the former (θ) are tangent to the supply functions of the latter (φ). This
means that the equilibrium is reached when the tourists’ marginal willingness
to pay for an additional unit of characteristic embedded in the tourism product
equals the amount of money for which firms are willing to embed the
characteristic in the final product. Returning to the hotel example above, in the
● ●
Quantity of public goodsz  *A Bz  *
φ, p
φB* = pB*
φA* = pA*
Supply Firm B
Supply Firm A
p(c1, c2,…, cn–1, z)φA(c1*, c2*,…, cn–1*, z; πB*)
φB(c1*, c2*,…, cn–1*, z; πB*)
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Figure 3. Market equilibrium with two tourists and two firms.
long run (when profits among hotels in different jurisdictions must equalize),
tourists with higher valuation for the public good (Type 2) buy the tourism
product with a higher quantity of public good (offered by firm B), whereas
tourists with lower valuation (Type 1) buy the tourism product bundle with a
lower quantity of public goods (offered by firm A). This is shown in Figure
3.17
Some implications
Higher prices do not imply higher profits
In a perfect competition setting such as the one considered here, one should
realize that the prices of the tourism supply are, ceteris paribus, higher in those
municipalities where higher endowments of public goods exist, not because
market power allows firms to set prices above marginal costs, but because quasi-
rents (derived from the environment where tourism supply is located) exist.18
This is shown in Figure 4, drawn according to the assumptions made previously.
On the demand side, it is assumed that two types of tourists exist, Tourist 1
and Tourist 2,19 so that, given identical private attributes, Tourist 1 has lower
valuation for the public good than Tourist 2.20 Hence, for a given
● ●
Quantity of public goods
φ, p
φB* = pB* = p2* = θ2*
φA* = pA* = p1* = θ1*
p(c1, c2,…, cn–1, z)
φB(c1*, c2*,…, cn–1*, z; πB*)
Supply Firm A
φA(c1*, c2*,…, cn–1*, z; πB*)
Supply Firm B
θ2(c1*, c2*,…, cn–1*, z; u2*)
θ1(c1*, c2*,…, cn–1*, z; u1*)
Valuation
Tourist 2
Valuation
Tourist 1
zA*          zB*
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Figure 4. Price differences between tourism products with identical private
characteristics but different public attributes in a perfect competition market.
bundle of private attributes embedded in the tourism product, Tourist 2 is
willing to pay more to stay at a hotel located (for instance) in a well-preserved
environment with a high quantity of public goods. Using the notation in the
second section of this paper
θ2 (–c1, –c2, . . . , –cn–1, z2; u2, m2) > θ1 (–c1, –c2, . . . , –cn–1, z1; u1, m1) (24)
where zB > zA. On the supply side, two municipalities exist with different
endowments of quantities and/or qualities of public goods: jurisdiction A (with
type A firms) supplies a small quantity of public goods, whereas jurisdiction
B (with type B firms) offers a lot of public goods.21,22 Both types of firms market
a tourism product with identical private characteristics, but different amounts
of public goods. Because of quasi-rents, marginal production costs for firms in
jurisdiction B are higher than for firms in jurisdiction A, since ∂C/∂z > 0 (as
assumed previously) and zB > zA imply ∂C(zB)/∂z > ∂C(zA)/∂z.
According to the notation in the second section of this paper
φB (–c1, –c2, . . . , –cn–1, zB; π, β) > φA (–c1, –c2, . . . , –cn–1, zA; π, β) (25)
with zB > zA. Thus, as shown in Figure 4, a hotel located in a run-down
environment would be willing to accept a lower price (p1*) for the same bundle
of private characteristics (c1, c2, . . . , cn–1) than a hotel located in a municipality
endowed with an excellent natural environment and a high quantity of public
goods (p2*). In the long run, the equilibrium price for a hotel in jurisdiction
B is bound to be higher than in jurisdiction A.
Price Price
Supply
Supply
p1*
p2*
p2* > p1*
MA* MB*
Demand for tourism
product Type 2
Demand for tourism
product Type 1
Quantity of
tourism
product
Quantity of
tourism
product
Jurisdiction A
(low quantity of
public goods)
Jurisdiction B
(high quantity of
public goods)
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Public goods and sustainability of tourism activity
The analysis in the previous section allows some preliminary conclusions on the
sustainability of tourism. Although, according to the setting above, differences
in the endowments of public goods among jurisdictions do not affect firms’
profits in the long run, it is likely that some adverse effects will arise with
respect to the sustainability of tourism activity. As a matter of fact, the analysis
above is eminently static: it is assumed that inputs are always available at given
prices and no questions are asked about the sustainability of the economic
activity in jurisdictions A and B in the future. However, it should be noted
that economic activity in jurisdiction A is based on private (rival) goods. This
implies that their use leads to their depletion. The sustainability of the tourism
activity depends on a firm’s ability to reproduce the inputs entering the
production function. A development model based on the intensive use of
limited (that is, exhaustible) environmental and territorial resources would
hardly be sustainable because of depletion and decreasing marginal productivity
of capital. For instance, as more hotels are built to accommodate increasing
demand, natural and territorial resources become scarcer and, since those re-
sources are clearly limited (a jurisdiction has fixed boundaries), a limit will be
reached at some time in the future. As more capital is employed in a setting
in which some resources are fixed, decreasing marginal productivity of capital
eventually kicks in.
On the other hand, tourism activity in jurisdiction B is founded on the
supply of public goods. As is well known, public goods are non-rival. This
implies that they are not exhausted by their use: a unit of public good may
be enjoyed by several tourists without losing its properties. Consider, for
instance, jurisdiction B’s cultural legacy. The tourism supply located in
jurisdiction B profits from the municipality’s monuments, gastronomy, art and
traditions. All these elements build up the jurisdiction’s cultural heritage and
cannot be cut off from the tourists’ experience when they visit that jurisdiction.
Besides, a jurisdiction’s cultural legacy does not diminish with the number of
tourists:23 a tourist’s enjoyment of a jurisdiction’s traditions, art or gastronomy
does not preclude other tourists’ enjoyment of the same elements. Another
example is the preservation of the environment and the landscape. Once the public
good is provided, every tourist is able to enjoy sightseeing a well-preserved
environment. Consider also a jurisdiction’s brand image (reputation, prestige): it
affects all the firms located there, regardless of a particular firm’s brand image.
Similar effects occur with public infrastructures and many other elements.
Although, in a perfect competition setting, higher prices linked to the supply
of public goods do not bring higher profits, they allow firms (by means of
higher tax revenues) to offer a product bundle containing a higher quantity and/
or quality of public goods. In a sort of virtuous circle, higher revenues lead to
higher levels of public goods feeding back successive waves that do not stop
because of diminishing returns (since public goods are non-rival). Therefore, a
jurisdiction supporting its growth through public goods is more likely to
achieve a development that is sustainable.24
This reasoning is shown in Figure 5. The broken curve shows the stock of
natural and territorial resources available in both jurisdiction A and B. The
curve in black shows the growth path in jurisdiction A, whose economic
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Figure 5. Sustainable (and unsustainable) tourism development with finite
resources.
activity25 requires the consumption of natural and territorial resources. A tourist
model of this kind would hardly be sustainable in the long run since, given
a finite endowment of resources, a limit (
–
A) exists from where further increases
of economic activity are not possible. The curve in grey shows jurisdiction B’s
sustainable development path, based on public goods: it is possible to increase
economic activity indefinitely without reaching the physical limits set by
natural and territorial resources. It should be noted that in a setting where
growth is based on public goods, tourism development and the preservation of
the environment are complementary goals. Since the environment can be
understood as a kind of public good, the preservation of natural resources might
allow sustained (and sustainable) economic growth in the long run. A tourism
model based on the supply of public goods would thus be able to escape the
trade-off between economic growth and preservation of the environment.
Empirical evidence
Preliminaries
The considerations above would be of little value if they were not supported
by empirical evidence. According to the analysis in the earlier section, one
would wish to investigate the plausibility of a relationship such as:
●
A Economic activity
Consumption of natural
and territorial resources
Resources available
Development path for
jurisdiction B
Development path for
jurisdiction A
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Pricei = g (PGi, v; θ) (26)
where ‘Pricei’ is the price in, say, hotel i, PGi denotes the quantity of public
goods available in the municipality where hotel i is located, v is a vector of
control variables and θ is a vector of parameters (to be estimated). In this
setting, if the hypothesis that public goods have a positive effect on the prices
of hotels were true, then one should expect that
∂g(BP, v; ^θ)
–––––––––– . (27)
    ∂BP
However, it is not easy to find homogeneous data regarding the supply of public
goods in several municipalities. The analysis that follows is based on Rigall-
I-Torrent (2003). It starts from a database containing information on price (in
former Spanish pesetas) and characteristics of double rooms (full board) for a
sample of 326 coastal hotels in 15 jurisdictions in Catalonia (in Spain’s north-
east) for six months of the year 2000. The analysis proceeds in an indirect way
with respect to Equation (26): the jurisdiction where a hotel is located is used
as a proxy for the quantity of public goods. In other words, it is assumed that
after controlling for the different relevant variables that affect prices, differences
in prices among jurisdictions are due to differences in endowments of public
goods. Thus, the relationship to be estimated is:
Pricei = g (Jurisdictioni, v; θ). (26)
There is much literature regarding marketing and pricing procedures in the
tourism sector. This literature identifies the different relevant characteristics of
the hotel product.26 Those characteristics are used here as control variables (that
is, they conform the vector v):27
– Category (variables: STAR1, 1-star hotel; STAR2, 2-star hotel; STAR3, 3-
star hotel; STAR4, 4-star hotel)
– Number of rooms (variable: ROOM)
– Hotel located in front of the beach (variable: BEACH)
– Room services (variable: ROOMSERV)
– Garden or balcony (variable: GARDBALC)
– Car park (variable: CARPARK)
– Swimming pool (variable: SWIMPOOL)
– Sports facilities (variable: SPORTS)
– Period of the year (variables: MAY1, first two weeks in May; MAY2, second
two weeks in May; JUNE1, first two weeks in June; JUNE2, second two
weeks in June; JULY1, first two weeks in July; JULY2, second two weeks
in July; AUGUST1, first two weeks in August; AUGUST2, second two
weeks in August; SEPTEMBER1, first two weeks in September; SEPTEM-
BER2, second two weeks in September; OCTOBER1, first two weeks in
October; OCTOBER2, second two weeks in October).
It could be argued that, besides the variables above, there are other elements
that cause price variations across municipalities, so that, in addition to the
supply of public goods, the variable ‘jurisdiction’ includes the effects that
several variables have on price. Failure to control for all relevant variables would
TOURISM ECONOMICS374
yield biased estimates. For instance, one could note that the degree of competition
might vary systematically among municipalities. However, this does not seem
plausible for our sample since, in the Catalan coast, generalized entry barriers
for new firms do not exist. Another variable that could affect hotel prices is
the distribution channel. One could suspect that hotels marketed through big tour
operators might charge different prices with respect to, for instance, those hotels
which have their own marketing and distribution channels. As a matter of fact,
tour operators’ bargaining power and different price-setting techniques could
give rise to differences in hotel prices. In order to control for this, this paper
uses prices published in tour operators’ brochures. Besides, if the behaviour and
price-setting techniques of tour operators differed among jurisdictions, then
differences in tour operators’ geographical distribution would systematically affect
hotel prices. Although no data are available to check these effects, the results
in Espinet (1999) and casual observations indicate that no relevant variations
should exist in the sample; that is, the variance in hotel prices is not likely
to depend on the geographical location of tour operators. Price differentials
could also be attributed to differences in climatic conditions. This does not apply
to the sample, because all municipalities considered are close to each other.
Therefore, although the variable ‘jurisdiction where a hotel is located’ might,
in principle, hide several factors which systematically influence hotel prices,
great care has been taken in designing the sample of hotels so that problems
emerging from omitting relevant variables are minimized.
Estimation
From the previous considerations, and after several trials, the following speci-
fication was estimated by OLS:28
(29)
where subscript i denotes the hotel (i = 1 . . . 279) and ui is a random error
term, independent and identically distributed (iid), with zero mean and
constant variance. The variables that indicate where a hotel is located are:
BLANES, Blanes; CALELLA, Calella; CAMBRILS, Cambrils; CASFELS,
Castelldefels; ESTARTIT, L’Estartit (jurisdiction: Torroella de Montgrí); STFELIU,
Sant Feliu de Guíxols; MALGRAT, Malgrat de Mar; PINEDA, Pineda de Mar;
PLATJARO, Platja d’Aro (jurisdiction: Castell-Platja d’Aro); ROSES, Roses;
SALOU, Salou; SITGES, Sitges; SUSANNA, Santa Susanna; TOSSA, Tossa de
Mar. The left-hand-side variable in logarithms (semi-logarithmic specification)
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Table 1. Empirical evidence of the effects of public goods on hotel prices: hedonic
regression.
Variables Coefficients Elasticities Std. dev. Significance
(Constant) 8.662 8.662 0.02 0.00
BLANES –0.127 –0.120 0.02 0.00
CALELLA –0.144 –0.134 0.01 0.00
CAMBRILS –0.028 –0.028 0.02 0.15
CASFELS 0.199 0.220 0.02 0.00
ESTARTIT 0.250 0.284 0.02 0.00
STFELIU –0.023 –0.023 0.02 0.22
MALGRAT –0.266 –0.234 0.02 0.00
PINEDA –0.165 –0.152 0.02 0.00
PLATJARO 0.110 0.116 0.02 0.00
ROSES 0.142 0.152 0.02 0.00
SALOU –0.014 –0.014 0.01 0.23
SITGES 0.342 0.408 0.02 0.00
SUSANNA –0.113 –0.107 0.02 0.00
TOSSA 0.155 0.167 0.02 0.00
ROOM 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
BEACH 0.090 0.094 0.01 0.00
ROOMSERV 0.111 0.118 0.01 0.00
GARDBALC 0.043 0.044 0.01 0.00
CARPARK 0.065 0.067 0.01 0.00
SWIMPOOL –0.017 –0.017 0.01 0.19
SPORTS 0.076 0.079 0.01 0.00
MAY1 –0.768 –0.536 0.02 0.00
MAY2 –0.719 –0.513 0.02 0.00
JUNE1 –0.628 –0.466 0.02 0.00
JUNE2 –0.483 –0.383 0.02 0.00
JULY1 –0.238 –0.211 0.02 0.00
JULY2 –0.105 –0.099 0.02 0.00
AUGUST2 –0.148 –0.138 0.02 0.00
SEPTEMBER1 –0.439 –0.355 0.02 0.00
SEPTEMBER2 –0.626 –0.465 0.02 0.00
OCTOBER1 –0.762 –0.533 0.02 0.00
OCTOBER2 –0.777 –0.540 0.02 0.00
STAR1 –0.111 –0.105 0.01 0.00
STAR3 0.150 0.162 0.01 0.00
STAR4 0.582 0.789 0.02 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.806 Sign. F 0.00
Note: Significant variables at (at least) 95% of confidence appear in bold.
allows the interpretation of the estimated coefficients as the percentage (after
performing the transformation eβ – 1) of a change in the value of a dummy
variable on price.29 No multicollinearity or heteroskedasticity problems were
observed.
Table 1 shows the results of estimating Equation (29) with the data in the
sample. The column ‘Elasticities’ shows the estimated coefficients transformed
in percentages. The fit of the model is very good (R2 = 0.806). Most of the
variables are significant.30 The coefficients associated to the variables referring
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Table 2. Price differentials among jurisdictions for a hotel with identical private
characteristics (index number Lloret de Mar = 100).
Jurisdiction Index
Sitges 140.76
L’Estartit 128.40
Castelldefels 122.04
Tossa de Mar 116.74
Roses 115.23
Platja d’Aro 111.58
Lloret de Mar 100.00
Salou 98.60
Sant Feliu de Guíxols 97.72
Cambrils 97.19
Santa Susanna 89.34
Blanes 88.04
Calella 86.60
Pineda de Mar 84.80
Malgrat de Mar 76.62
to ‘jurisdiction’ show the effect of a given municipality on hotel prices: they
indicate the price differential (percentage) between two hotels offering identical
bundles of private goods (in the same period of the year) but, since they are
located in different jurisdictions, distinct public characteristics. From Table 1,
it is possible to compute price indices showing the effects of public charac-
teristics on hotel prices in different municipalities. This is shown in Table 2,
where Lloret de Mar is the reference, taking a value 100.31 It is important to
note that wide differences exist among price levels in different jurisdictions.
For instance, the price of a hotel located in the municipality at the top of the
ranking is 83.7% higher than that for a hotel located in the jurisdiction at
the bottom of the list. For a given set of private characteristics (category,
number of rooms, being located in front of the beach, having room service,
garden or balcony, car park, swimming pool or sports facilities) and period of
the year, differences arise which, given the considerations above, can be rea-
sonably attributed to different endowments of public goods (in a broad sense)
in distinct municipalities. Therefore, empirical evidence seems to confirm the
plausibility of the hypothesis that public goods positively affect private tourism
supply.
Concluding remarks
This paper argues (both theoretically and empirically) that public goods have
a positive influence on the supply of private tourism firms: greater endowment
of public goods leads to higher prices for tourism goods with otherwise identical
private characteristics. In turn, higher prices would lead to higher revenues for
those firms located in jurisdictions where greater supply of public goods exists.
This is important with regard to the sustainability of tourism. Indeed, although
in a perfect competition setting higher prices would not bring higher profits
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in the long run, they would allow (by means of higher tax revenues) firms to
offer a product bundle containing higher quantities and/or qualities of public
goods. Thus, in a sort of virtuous circle, higher revenues could lead to higher
levels of public goods feeding back successive waves of investment and growth
that would not stop because of diminishing returns (since public goods are non-
rival). At the end of the day, a tourism jurisdiction relying on a tourism model
supported by a greater quantity and/or quality of public goods would be able
to enjoy a greater growth margin than a jurisdiction relying on a growth model
based on the intensive use of rival, limited resources.
Endnotes
1. Since the data available for the empirical analysis refer to hotels, ‘tourism product’ in this paper
is usually identified with ‘hotel product’.
2. The empirical analysis in the section ‘Some implications’ considers characteristics ci as dichotomic.
For instance, if c1 refers to the availability of a swimming pool in a hotel, then c
j
i takes the value
of 1 if the hotel j offers that kind of facility and 0 otherwise.
3. If two hotels are located in the same environment (which implies identical z), then their outputs
will differ if at least one of the values, c mi, varies from any of the values, c
n
i.
4. The term, x, can be understood as a bundle of different products, each in turn composed of
different characteristics.
5. It is assumed that each of the characteristics of a product yields utility to the consumer (that
is, there are no ‘bads’).
6. It is assumed that the price function, p(c), is not too concave, so that first order conditions are
necessary and sufficient in order to get a maximum (see Rosen, 1974).
7. The interpretation of Equation (7) is identical, changing ‘private characteristic’ for ‘public good’.
8. Following the notation above, Equation (9) represents the amount of money a tourist with
income m is willing to forego (pay) to be able to enjoy a stay in a hotel with characteristics
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn–1, z).
9. Inequalities follow from the strict concavity of the utility function.
10. In other words, the marginal valuations (or maximum price a consumer is willing to pay) for
an additional unit of each attribute.
11. For given levels of utility and income.
12. Remember that the comparison is among hotels with identical private characteristics (which have
identical prices in different municipalities because of the perfect competition assumption). Thus,
the price of the hotel where Tourist 2 spends his or her holiday must be more expensive than
Tourist 1’s, since pz > 0 and z
2 > z1.
13. It is assumed that first order conditions are both necessary and sufficient, so that a maximum
is attained.
14. Note that, in the short run, the condition obtained from ∂π/∂z = 0 would yield the quantity
of public good wished by a hotel j, z j*. However, since the decision on the final quantity of
public goods provided, –z, would not depend on hotel j, it would usually be the case that
z j* = –z. Thus, the profit for firm j would normally be lower in the short run.
15. See Equation (9).
16. Again, it is assumed that the conditions for a maximum are satisfied.
17. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the tourism market is in equilibrium, that is, that
no excess demand or supply exists. It could be argued that this assumption does not suit tourism
markets, since mismatches between supply and demand abound. However, it should be noted
that mismatches arise because adjustment costs are ignored. Once adjustment costs are taken
into account, disequilibrium vanishes. See Maddala (1983) for an in-depth analysis of these
questions.
18. This varies from the findings of Taylor and Smith (2000), who show that differentiated
environmental characteristics allow private firms to set prices above marginal costs, but it is in
accordance with the empirical setting considered.
19. It is assumed that there are high numbers of both types of individuals, so that no monopsony
exists in the market for the tourism product.
20. See Figure 2.
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21. It is assumed that high numbers of both types of firms exist in both markets, so that no
monopoly power is possible.
22. See Figure 3.
23. Although, in some cases, congestion may occur: consider, for instance, tourists visiting a
museum.
24. For the sake of concreteness, imagine that the aggregate production function in municipality
A at time t is Y(t) = B(t)•Kα(t)•L1–α(t), where Y is aggregate product, B is technology, K is capital,
L labour and B > 0 and 0 < α < 1. This production function shows constant returns to scale
and decreasing marginal products for capital and labour. Thus, unless technology changes, per
capita growth is limited. The production function for municipality B would be
Y(t) = B(t)•Z1–a(t)•Ka(t)•L1–a(t),
where Z is ‘public goods’. Now, since, public goods are non-rival, per capita growth can continue
indefinitely. See, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999).
25. Measured, for instance, as the number of tourists attracted or the gross domestic product
obtained.
26. See, for instance, Espinet (1999), Espinet and Fluvià (2001) and Espinet et al (2003).
27. All the control variables, except the number of rooms, are dichotomic, taking the value 1 when
the condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise.
28. A specification without logarithms was also carried out. However, the fitting obtained was worse
than when using logarithms. Anyway, since all variables (except the number of rooms) are
dichotomic, the number of easily interpretable alternative specifications is clearly limited. Hence,
no tests based on Box–Cox transformations regarding the functional specification are presented.
29. Remember that prices were originally in Spanish pesetas. The irrevocable conversion rate for the
euro vis-à-vis the Spanish peseta is €1 = 166.386 Spanish pesetas.
30. As a matter of fact, only the coefficients associated to ‘Swimming pool’, ‘Sant Feliu de Guíxols’,
‘Cambrils’ and ‘Salou’ are not statistically different from zero.
31. Obviously, it is possible to change the reference by a simple operation without changing the
results.
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